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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of having a labour contract on a range of employee outcomes (hours 
worked, social insurance coverage, subjective wellbeing and wages) for a sample of urban and migrant 
workers in China. A methodological contribution is that we use propensity score matching, which allows 
us to draw causal inferences about the relationship between having a labour contract and each of these 
variables. We find that the effect of having a labour contract on employee outcomes is generally large and 
larger than the findings in other studies suggest. As such, our results suggest that China's Labour 
Contract Law, which has made signing labour contracts mandatory, has been effective in improving the 
outcomes for Chinese workers. 
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This paper examines the effect of having a labour contract on a range of employee outcomes (hours 
worked, social insurance coverage, subjective wellbeing and wages) for a sample of urban and 
migrant workers in China. A methodological contribution is that we use propensity score matching, 
which allows us to draw causal inferences about the relationship between having a labour contract 
and each of these variables. We find that the effect of having a labour contract on employee 
outcomes is generally large and larger than the findings in other studies suggest. As such, our 
results suggest that China’s Labour Contract Law, which has made signing labour contracts 
mandatory, has been effective in improving the outcomes for Chinese workers. 
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There is a lot of interest in the effect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on 
labour market outcomes around the globe. To this point, the evidence on the 
effectiveness of EPL has been mixed. Some studies have found that EPL is effective 
in generating positive labour market outcomes for workers (Alvarez & Veracierto, 
1998; Bentolila & Bertola, 1990). However, other studies have found that EPL has no 
effect on outcomes for workers (Ahsan & Pages, 2009; Paes de Barros & Corseuil, 
2004) or that the outcomes can be negative (Besley & Burgess, 2004; Lin, 2013). 
 
China’s new Labour Contract Law, which came into effect in 2008, represents a 
significant piece of EPL in the world’s largest transition economy. The Labour 
Contract Law has been described as “the most significant reform to the law of 
employment relations [in China] in more than a decade” (Cooney, Biddulph, Li & 
Zhu, 2007, p. 786). It has been suggested that the “new law [has] aroused more public 
debate than perhaps any piece of legislation in the history of China” (Friedman & 
Lee, 2010, p. 525). The Labour Contract Law requires all workers to have a written 
contract and states that any employer with an employee without a written labour 
contract is required to double his or her wages for each month worked without a 
contract, beginning with the second month. The Labour Contract Law also specifies 
that any employee who has worked for more than a decade with an employer and 
signed two successive fixed term contracts, must be given a open-ended contract. 
Finally, the Labour Contract Law reaffirms pre-existing social insurance, wage and 
maximum working hour obligations on employers (Cooney et al., 2007; Li, 2008).   
While concern was expressed, at least initially, about the extent to which it would be 
enforced (see eg. Zheng, 2009) a feature of China’s Labour Contract Law is that the 
regulations are strict, relative to other countries. Based on the measure of EPL 
strictness applied to OECD countries (OECD, 2004), China would rank third in terms 
of EPL strictness among OECD countries (Gallagher, Giles, Park & Wang 2013). 
 
China’s Labour Contract Law represents a good opportunity to study the effectiveness 
of EPL in an economy with a fast evolving labour market. Some recent studies have 
taken the opportunity to examine the effect of China’s new Contract Law on a range 
of worker benefits (see eg. Cheng, Nielsen & Smyth 2014; Cui, Ge & Jing, 2013; 
Freeman & Li, 2013; Gallagher et al. 2013; Gao, Yang & Li, 2012; Wang, Guo & 
Cheng 2013). The results from these studies suggest that the Contract Law has 
improved employee benefits, particularly for migrant workers. However, despite the 
large potential impact of the new law on China’s urban workforce, there is still a 
dearth of empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the legislation. 
 
In this paper we use propensity score matching to evaluate the effect of the Contract 
Law on a number of outcomes for migrant and urban workers, in which having a 
labour contract is considered as a treatment. Using this approach, we examine the 
labour market outcome of a given employee who is treated (ie. has a labour contract) 
with the hypothetical labour market outcome that would have prevailed if the same 
worker had not been treated (ie. did not receive a labour contract).  
 
We make the following contributions to the existing literature. First, we add to the 
paucity of existing empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the Chinese Contract 
Law in improving the wellbeing of migrant and urban employees. Second, we 
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consider a range of labour market and socioeconomic outcomes (hours worked, social 
insurance coverage, subjective wellbeing and wages). This is a much broader range of 
outcomes than previous studies, which have tended to focus on specific labour market 
outcomes such as access to social insurance (Freeman & Li, 2013; Wang et al., 2013; 
Cheng et al., 2014; Gao et al 2012), wage and non wage benefits (Cui et al 2013) or 
the incidence of wage arrears (Freeman & Li, 2013). 
 
A third contribution is that, in contrast to previous studies, which have used firm level 
data to analyse the effect of labour contracts on wages, we use individual-level data. 
A limitation of using firm level data is that it is not possible to account for individual 
heterogeneities. For example, employing firm level data, Cui et al (2013) construct a 
variable for the firm level wage by dividing total wage expenditure by the number of 
employees in the firm, thus obfuscating important microeconomic effects.   
 
A fourth contribution is that we include a full set of controls in all regressions. 
Specifically, in the wages regression we control for experience and years of schooling 
and in the hours worked regression we control for wages, consistent with theoretical 
considerations and broader literature on the determinants of labour supply and wages. 
Previous studies only include a limited number of controls, which potentially biases 
the estimates. For example, in examining the effect of labour contracts on wages Cui 
et al (2013) do not control for years of schooling or experience.   
 
Finally, a major problem with the extant literature is that it fails to address the fact 
that whether an employee has a labour contract is endogenous (ie. employees who 
have more ability, or are better credentialed, are more likely to have labour contracts). 
We make a methodological contribution to the literature in that we use a novel 
method (propensity score matching) to address the endogeneity problem that has 
plagued previous studies examining China’s Labour Contract Law. Propensity score 
matching reduces potential endogeneity and allows us to draw causal inferences about 
the effect of labour contracts on employee outcomes with non-experimental data. 
 
2. China’s Labour Contract Law 
 
China’s Labour Contract Law was passed by the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress on June 29, 2007 and started to take effect on January 1, 2008. The 
law is intended to specify the rights and obligations of parties to labour contracts and 
to give employees more legal rights to protect job security. While the law was 
welcomed by non-government organisations (NGOs) and worker rights’ advocates, it 
was criticized by employer groups who predicted that it would have a negative effect 
on the competitiveness of business in China (Becker & Elfstrom, 2010). In initial 
modelling of the impact of the law, Chen and Funke (2009) concluded that the Labour 
Contract Law would have only a small effect upon employment and possibly that 
induced labour costs might adversely effect employment. In the lead-up to the 
legislation coming into force, employers used a range of methods to avoid their 
impending legal obligations, such as firing and then rehiring the same workers to get 
around the provisions granting ten-year employees transfer to non-fixed-term 
contracts. Well-publicised instances of this occurred when Huawei and LG China 
laid-off workers, only to immediately rehire them, to avoid signing open-ended 
contracts. NGOs and the unions responded by mounting mass “legal publicity” (pu fa) 




In the aftermath of the legislation coming into operation, much concern was expressed 
about whether it would be enforced (Zheng, 2009). A prevailing view was that the 
only firms that would comply with the law would be multinational enterprises and 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and that it would have little effect on worker well-
being (Freeman & Li, 2013). An often-made argument was that the workers would be 
unable to enforce their rights. It is well known that in China that the All China 
Federation of Trade Unions—the only official trade union—is more aligned with the 
government and firms than with workers (Zheng, 2009). While the coverage of the 
law is intended to be national, in practice it is left to sub-provincial level officials to 
implement the law.  It might not be in the best interests of local officials to enforce 
the law if it has an adverse effect on investment in the local region (Cui et al., 2013). 
Even if the sub-provincial officials were minded to enforce the law, most faced severe 
resource constraints. For example, one survey found that there were just 137 labour 
inspectors supervising 500,000 enterprises in Guangzhou (Cui et al., 2013).   
 
Nevertheless, despite the initial scepticism that the Labour Contract Law would have 
any difference, there is evidence that the proportion of employees signing contracts 
has increased. Based on a survey of almost 600 human resources managers, Cheng 
and Yang (2010) found that the Labour Contract Law has increased the likelihood of 
signing contracts, increased the number of open-ended contracts and resulted in more 
careful recruitment, and dismissal, decisions. According to official statistics, in 2010, 
97 per cent of employees had signed contracts. In addition, according to the official 
statistics, in 2010 there were about 9.2 million collective contracts, covering about 
114 million employees, which was 76.5 per cent higher than in 2007 (Cui et al., 
2013). Cheng, Wang and Chen (2014) and Gallagher et al. (2013) provide statistics 
on the prevalence of labour contracts, based on the 2009 Migrant Workers Survey in 
the Pearl River Delta of Guangdong Province (MWS-PRD) and the 2010 China 
Urban Labour Survey (CULS) respectively.
1
 The numbers are not as impressive as the 
official statistics. Based on the 2009 MWS-PRD, 62 per cent of migrant workers 
signed labour contracts, among which the majority (78 per cent) were short (less than 
1 year) and medium terms (1-3 years). Based on the 2010 CULS, 71 per cent of urban 
locals and 34 per cent of migrants had signed labour contracts. This, however, still 
represented a significant improvement over coverage in the 2001 and 2005 CULS.
2
 
The 2010 CULS also asked respondents about awareness of the Labour Contract Law. 
Almost all workers (95 per cent of urban locals and 89 per cent of migrants) knew 
they had a right to sign a labour contract. Most knew that they were entitled to be paid 
double wages for each month worked beyond the period in which the labour contract 







                                                        
1 The 2009 MWS-PRD covered nine cities in the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong province which is the largest 
destination for migrant workers, and the 2010 CULS covered five cities (Shanghai, Shenyang, Wuhan, Xian and 
Fuzhou). 
2 Based on the data employed in the present study, 90.5 per cent of urban workers, and 65.8 per cent of migrant 
workers, had signed labour contracts in 2008 – see Table 1 below. 
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3. Existing Literature 
 
As noted in the introduction, the literature on the effectiveness of the Labour Contract 
Law on worker wellbeing is relatively scant. There are few studies that examine the 
effect of having a labour contract on the probability that migrants and/or urban locals 
will receive social insurance, controlling for the demographic and human capital 
characteristics of the individual (Cheng et al., 2014; Freeman & Li, 2013; Gao et al., 
2012; Gallagher et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2013). Each of these studies finds that 
signing a labour contract increases the likelihood of receiving social insurance. Some 
of these studies suggest that for migrant workers, signing a labour contract is 
becoming more important than household registration (hukou) status in determining 
access to social insurance schemes (Cheng et al., 2014; Gao et al., 2012).  
 
In addition to examining the effect of migrants signing a labour contract on social 
insurance coverage, Freeman and Li (2013) examined the effect of migrants signing a 
contract on the likelihood of wage arrears and the likelihood of a union presence in 
the workplace. They found that if a migrant worker signed a labour contract this 
reduced the likelihood of experiencing wage arrears and increased the likelihood of 
having a union presence in their workplace. Similarly, as well as considering the 
effect of urban workers’ signing a labour contract on social insurance coverage, Wang 
et al. (2013) examined the effect of signing a labour contract on other employee 
benefits, such as being granted leave on public holidays and weekends, and find that 
urban workers who signed contracts are more likely to receive these benefits. Finally, 
using panel data collected from manufacturing enterprises from 1998 to 2008, Cui et 
al. (2008) found that the Labour Contract Law improved average wage and average 
non-wage compensation and reduced the wage elasticity of labour demand.  
 
To summarize, there are few studies that have examined the effect of the Labour 
Contract Law on employee outcomes for migrants and/or urban locals, despite 
considerable speculation about the efficacy of the legislation in addressing its stated 
purpose. Of those studies that do exist, most focus on one or two specific benefits, 
rather than considering a more comprehensive range of outcomes. In addition, the 
existing literature does not specifically address the fact that signing a labour contract 




The data used in this study was collected in 2008 by the Rural-Urban Migration in 
China (RUMiC) project at the Australian National University. The sample size is 
18,000 households (5,000 rural-urban migrant, 5,000 urban and 8,000 rural 
households) in 15 cities of the nine largest municipalities/provinces in terms of 
sending and receiving migrants. These municipalities/provinces are: Shanghai, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hubei, Henan, Anhui, Chongqing, Sichuan and Guangdong.
3
 The 
analysis in the present study is restricted to migrant and urban households. The 
sample is further limited to individuals, aged 16-64, who work in a paid job. Thus, the 
final sample consisted of 4756 migrant workers and 6239 urban workers. 
 
                                                        
3 See http://rse.anu.edu.au/rumici/ for more information about the project including a map of survey regions. 
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The sample size across the cities was distributed according to the overall population 
size of the city. For urban households, the sampling design was based on that of the 
official annual urban household survey, which is administered by the National Bureau 
of Statistics of China. For rural-urban migrant households, the RUMiC project team 
conducted a census of all work places in each of the 15 target cities and then used the 
total number of workers, and the total number of migrant workers, in these 
workplaces to estimate the size of the migrant worker population in each of the cities. 
The census information provided a sampling framework for subsequent random 
sampling within each selected workplace. Interviewers selected the final sample of 
migrant workers based on randomly selected birth month and then made an 




Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for migrant and urban workers. Without 
controlling for other variables, migrant workers and urban workers with a labour 
contract have higher hourly and monthly wages, less monthly working hours, higher 
subjective wellbeing indicators and higher incidence of access to employee benefits 
(ie. industrial injury and unemployment insurance, housing provident fund and 
superannuation).
5
 The differences are more significant among urban workers than 
migrant workers, except for monthly working hours and subjective wellbeing.  
 





Treatment effect of labour contract in regression modelling 
We first examine the probability of signing a labour contract (Equation 1) and then 
the relationship between signing a labour contract and employee outcomes (wages, 
hours worked, subjective wellbeing and access to employee benefits) (Equation 2): 
 
                                                         (1)                                                                                                      
 
                                          (2)                                                     
 
Here Contracti denotes whether the ith worker has a labour contract (set equal to 1 if 
the worker has a labour contract; otherwise zero) at the time of survey; Y is the 
employee outcome; X is a vector of control variables and v or ε is an error term 
containing the effects of unobserved variables (δ) and the non-linear effect of 
observed variables (θ). A logit model is used to estimate Equation 1. To estimate 
Equation 2, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used when Y denotes wages, 
hours worked or subjective wellbeing, while a logit model is used when Y denotes 
                                                        
4 Within each city the sampling frame for migrants is defined on the basis of workplaces rather than residence. 
This is mainly because a sizable proportion of migrant workers in China live in workplace dormitories, 
construction sites and other workplaces. Thus, the residential based sampling would be biased due to the omission 
of this group of migrants - see Kong (2010) for more details.  
5 In this study subjective wellbeing is evaluated using the General Health Questionnaire-12 (GHQ-12), which is 
designed to assess psychological wellbeing. GHQ, as a measure of subjective wellbeing, has been widely 
employed in the economics and psychology literature (see eg. Clark & Oswald, 1994, 2002). Following the study 
by Akay, Giulietti, Robalino and Zimmermann (2013), we add the scores of the 12 standard questions, which 
contain responses with scores from 0 to 3 (from worst to best), to obtain an overall index of subjective wellbeing, 
which ranges from 0 to 36. For a previous study using the GHQ-12 from the RUMiC, see Friedman (2013). 
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participation in social insurance or other employee benefits (set equal to 1 if the 




In Equation 2, if there are no unobservable heterogeneous factors that affect the 
probability of signing a labour contract and the outcome variable, the coefficient β 
identifies the average effect of signing a labour contract on the employee outcome. 
However, it is unlikely that controlling for even a rich set of variables will completely 
eliminate the selection bias contained in almost any non-experimental data.  
 
Conceptually, it is difficult to draw conclusions about a causal effect running from 
signing a labour contract to employee outcomes because of potential endogeneity. 
The results may be biased because the residual (depicted by δ in Equation 2) may 
contain factors related to having a labour contract, which are not captured by 
observed variables, such as education, gender, and age. In the context of this study, 
workers with more ability may be more likely to be offered labour contracts by 
employers. In other words, one’s labour contract status may not be exogenously 
determined solely by the legal requirements of the Labour Contract Law, but, at least 
in part, may depend on one’s ability and other unobserved credentials, as evaluated by 
one’s employer. Those workers with more ability would earn higher-than-average 
wages in the labour market, irrespective of whether they have a labour contract. 
 
Treatment effect of labour contract in propensity score matching 
In order to draw causal inferences about the effect of signing a labour contract on 
employee outcomes, we employ a matching estimator, using propensity score 
matching. This entails asking the question: What is the outcome (in terms of wages, 
hours worked, access to employee benefits and subjective wellbeing) for worker i 
who is treated (here, signed a contract), relative to the hypothetical outcome that 
would have prevailed if the same worker had not been treated (signed a contract)? 
 
The treatment effect approach can reduce potential endogeneity, alleviate bias due to 
systematic difference and allow one to draw casual inference in non-experimental 
labour studies (Dehejia, 2005; Dehejia & Wahba, 2002). In contrast to using OLS, the 
propensity score matching approach does not necessarily need to assume a linear 
relationship when conditional independence is assumed. This implies that treatment 
effect results are unbiased compared to OLS results. Moreover, even if there exists 
unobserved variables, the treatment effect approach can assign different weights to 
individual samples, depending on their probability of having a labour contract based 
on observed variables. The weights can reasonably reflect unobserved variables.  
 
In the case of a binary treatment, the treatment indicator is the treatment variable (set 
equal to 1 if worker has a labour contract; otherwise zero). The potential outcomes are 
then defined as Yi(Di) for each worker i, where i = 1,…, N and N denotes the 
population. The average treatment effect (ATE) for worker i (ie. a randomly selected 
worker from the population) can be written as: 
                                                        
6 When the labour market outcome is wage, Equation 2 is an extended form of the Mincer wage equation. When 
the labour market outcome is hours worked, we include wage rate per hour on the right hand side. For subjective 
wellbeing, using OLS entails treating subjective wellbeing as cardinal as opposed to ordinal, which would entail 
employing an ordered logit model. Estimates of the determinants of subjective wellbeing have been found to be 
not sensitive to treating subjective wellbeing as ordinal or cardinal (see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004 or 




       ( )   ( )                                                                                               (3) 
 
where E(·) denotes the mathematical expectation operation, ie. the population average 
of a random variable ; Di is the treatment variable (takes the value 1 if the ith worker 
has a labour contract, zero otherwise); Yi(1) is the employee outcome variable in the 
treatment state and Yi(0) is the employee outcome variable in the non-treatment state. 
However, the treated workers cannot be observed in the non-treatment state. In other 
words, only one of the potential outcomes is observed for each worker i. Therefore, it 
is necessary to construct the unobserved, or counterfactual, outcome.  
 
The counterfactual mean for those being treated [E(Y(0)|D=1)] is unobservable. 
Therefore, one has to choose a proper substitute for it in order to estimate the average 
treatment effect. If a treatment is randomized, under certain assumptions it is 
sufficient to compare the average outcome of the treated group [E(Y(1)|D=1)] and 
untreated (control) group [E(Y(0)|D=0)]. The difference in these two average 
outcomes is regarded as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT):  
 
       ( )|        ( )|                                                                    (4)     
 
In a randomised experiment, the average outcome of the untreated group (those who 
have not signed a labour contract) is a consistent estimate of the counterfactual 
[E(Y(0)|D=0)] for the treated group (those who have signed a labour contract) if there 
is no randomization and substitution biases (Heckman & Smith, 1995): 
 
   ( )|        ( )|                                                                                 (5)         
 
However, having a labour contract is not a randomised experiment in observational 
data, such as that contained in RUMiC. The objective of the propensity score 
matching approach is to make the average outcome of the untreated group 
[E(Y(0)|D=0)] as similar as possible to that of the counterfactual [E(Y(0)|D=1)]. In 
order to identity a casual treatment effect, similar to other studies applying propensity 
score matching to observational data, we invoke the conditional independence 
assumption.
7
 In this study, conditional on workers’ characteristics, the potential 
outcome in the untreated state is independent of the treatment status: 
   
 ( ( )|     ( )     ( )|     ( )                                                         (6)                                                  
 
Here, D, Y(1) and Y(0) have the same meanings as in Equation 3 and P(X) is the 
propensity score of signing a labour contract estimated from Equation 1: 
 
 ( )     (   | )              (7)                                                                                                                                                   
 
                                                        
7 The conditional independence assumption assumes that potential outcomes are independent of the 
treatment assignment. This inevitably represents a strong assumption in labour studies using 
observational data (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2006). However, this assumption is not unreasonable in this 
study because in the RUMiC data, our modelling results, reported later, suggest that observed firm and 
job related factors are far more important than observed personal characteristics, and thus probably also 
unobserved personal characteristics, in explaining employee outcomes – see also Ge and Lehmann 
(2013) who reach the same conclusion, employing RUMiC data. 
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Based on the covariates in Table 1, nearest neighbour, kernel, and stratification 
methods are used to implement propensity score matching (Becker & Ichino, 2002).  
 
 
Heterogeneous treatment effect of labour contract 
A basic paradigm in the literature based on the potential outcomes model is that there 
can be individual heterogeneity in treatment effects, which stands in contrast to 
traditional regression modelling, which assumes constant parameters. Currently little 
attention is paid to the analysis of the heterogeneity of treatment effects in China’s 
labour studies. This may be particularly important for migrant workers since they 
have a significantly lower incidence of signing labour contracts than urban workers. 
In particular, little is known in the existing literature as to whether a positive selection 
effect (ie. workers who are most likely to have a labour contract benefit most from the 
Labour Contract Law), a negative selection effect (ie. workers who are least likely to 
have a labour contract benefit most from the Labour Contract Law) or a 
balanced/ambiguous effect prevails in China’s urban labour market. 
 
Recognition that the treatment effect can be heterogeneous has spurned new methods 
for generating causal inference as well as new interpretations of extant methods. 
Following other studies (Brand & Xie, 2010; Xie, 2013; Xie et al., 2012), we estimate 




Level 1:                                         (8)                                                             
 
Here δ1j is the average treatment effect of signing a labour contract on the ith worker’s 
outcome in the jth stratum of the propensity score. In other words, δ1j is the mean 
difference in outcomes between workers with, and without, a labour contract. μ is the 
error term. Because the treatment effect of signing a labour contract is related to the 
propensity to sign a labour contract, the model estimates:  
 
Level 2:                                                                                (9)                                                                   
 
Here Stratumj is the j stratum of the propensity score and π1 is the heterogeneous 
treatment effect of signing a labour contract among workers at different strata of 
propensity score. τ is the error term.
9
  The propensity score, calculated from Equation 
1, is used to construct balanced propensity score strata and, within each stratum, 
estimates the average treatment effect. The linear trend in treatment effects are tested 




Table 2 presents the estimates from the logit model for Equation 1. The results are 
generally consistent with other recent studies examining the determinants of who 
receives a labour contract (see eg. Cheng et al., 2014; Gallagher et al., 2013). The 
                                                        
8 For detailed discussion of the stratification-multilevel model, see Guo and Fraser (2010) and Xie et al. 
(2012). 
9 One potential issue with the hierarchical HTE model is that there may not be enough treated cases in 
the lowest propensity score stratum, or enough control cases in the highest propensity score stratum, to 
estimate the Level-1 effect (Equation 8). To address this issue, following Xie et al. (2012), we merge 
small strata at the low end and high end in the analysis. 
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results suggest that males and married migrant workers are 3 per cent and 5 per cent 
more likely to receive a labour contract respectively; however, gender and marital 
status are insignificant in the sample of urban workers. Migrant workers in poor 
health have a 22 per cent lower likelihood of having a labour contract while urban 
workers in poor health have just a 4 per cent lower likelihood of receiving a contract. 
Based on the marginal effects, education, work experience, occupational training and 
employer size are more important for migrant workers than urban workers in 
determining access to a labour contract. This finding is entirely consistent with that of 
Gallagher et al. (2013, p.15), who concluded, based on 2010 CULS data, that 
“treatment of migrants differs much more with individual or job characteristics than 
treatment of local residents”. The statistically significant coefficients for education, 
work experience and occupational training, each of which is related to one’s ability, 
are suggestive that signing a labour contract is not fully exogenous.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Table 3 presents the OLS estimates for the determinants of hourly and monthly 
wages. Migrant workers with a labour contract receive a 12.1 per cent higher hourly 
wage and a 5.9 per cent higher monthly wage. Urban workers with a labour contract 
receive a 25.3 per cent higher hourly wage and a 23.6 per cent higher monthly wage. 
Cheng et al. (2014) reached mixed results for migrant workers in Guangdong 
province. They found that having a labour contract decreased the natural log of the 
monthly base wage by 5.6 per cent, but increased the natural log of hourly income 
(base wage plus overtime allowance) by approximately 6.7 per cent.  Cui et al. (2013) 
found that the Labour Contract Law increased average wages in manufacturing firms 
by 21.6 per cent. However, because Cui et al. (2013) use firm level data, they do not 
estimate the effect of signing an individual labour contract on individual wages or 
control for schooling or experience, as is standard in a Mincer equation.  
 
The results for the other variables (eg. schooling, experience, gender, poor health, 
occupational training and firm size) are consistent with previous studies for urban 
China and studies for other countries. One issue is that returns to schooling are 
endogenous. For our purposes one would be concerned if addressing this affected the 
coefficient on having a labour contract. To examine this issue, we used the propensity 
score, estimated from Equation 1, as a proxy of ability. The results are shown in 
appendix 1. The results show that personal ability has a statistically significant 
positive effect on migrant workers’ hourly wage and on urban workers’ monthly 
wage. Nonetheless,  even after taking into account personal ability, having a labour 
contract still has the same magnitude of effect on hourly and monthly wages. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Table 4 presents the OLS estimates for the determinants of monthly working hours. 
Having a labour contract reduces monthly working hours by 6 per cent for migrant 
workers. However, it has no significant effect among urban workers. The signs on the 
coefficients of most of the other variables are consistent with previous studies of the 
determinants of labour supply in China (see eg. Li & Zax, 2003; Mishra & Smyth, 
2013; Smyth, Qian, Nielsen & Kaempfer, 2013). Of note, the coefficient on monthly 
wages is negative and statistically significant for migrant workers, which suggests the 
existence of a backward bending labour supply curve. A potential concern with the 
11 
 
OLS estimates is that wages are endogenous and instrumenting for wages might 
change the coefficient on having a labour contract. To address this issue, we 
instrumented for wages using the square of years of schooling and age interacted with 
education, which are common instrumental variables in labour supply equations (see 
also Mishra & Smyth, 2013, who follow the same strategy).  The results are reported 
in appendix 2. The coefficient on wages is now positive for migrant workers, 
suggesting that the substitution effect outweighs the income effect. The switch from a 
negative to positive coefficient on wages in the instrumental variable estimates is 
consistent with Li and Zax (2003). Of relevance for our purposes, though, the 
coefficient on having a labour contract for migrant workers in the instrumental 
variable estimates is identical to the OLS estimates to two decimal places. 
 
 [Table 4 here] 
 
Table 5 presents the OLS results for the determinants of subjective wellbeing. Having 
a labour contract increases the GHQ-12 index by 0.35 points for migrant workers and 
0.73 points for urban workers. This result is consistent with the finding in studies for 
other countries that having a labour contract increases subjective wellbeing (see eg. de 
Graf Zijl, 2005). The reasoning is that having a contract provides more job security. 
According to De Witte and Naswal (2003), an individual with a temporary or insecure 
job arrangement will experience lower subjective wellbeing because of higher job 
stress due to more aggravating work characteristics, asymmetrical psychological 
contracts or deprivation due to lack of identity with the employer. For migrant 
workers, having unemployment insurance and industrial injury insurance increases 
subjective wellbeing, while having superannuation and participating in the house 
provident fund decreases subjective wellbeing. To access the latter two benefits, 
migrant workers need to work in cities until retirement age and purchase a house, 
which is not feasible for the vast majority of migrant workers who will be returning to 
the countryside by their forties or fifties. In addition, these benefits cannot be 
transferred when they migrate elsewhere and the accumulative contributions to these 
accounts cannot be withdrawn when they return to the countryside. The results for the 
other variables (eg. age, education, gender, health status, income and marital status) 
are consistent with previous studies of the determinants of subjective wellbeing in 
urban China (Appleton & Song, 2008; Knight & Gunatilaka, 2010). 
  
[Table 5 here] 
 
Tables 6 and 7 present the estimates from a logit model for the probability that 
migrant and urban workers receive various employee benefits. Having a labour 
contract increases the probability of having unemployment insurance, superannuation 
and industrial injury insurance and participating in the housing provident fund among 
migrant workers by 11, 18, 18 and 5 per cent respectively and among urban workers 
by 37, 20, 39 and 34 per cent respectively. These results are consistent with previous 
studies which have found that having a labour contract increases the likelihood of 
participating in social insurance schemes in China (see Cheng et al., 2014; Freeman & 
Li, 2013; Gallagher et al., 2013; Gao et al., 2012). The results, however, differ in 
terms of relative magnitude between migrant workers and urban workers from 
Gallagher et al (2013) who found, using 2010 CULS, that having a labour contract 
was a stronger predictor of participating in social insurance for migrant workers than 
urban workers. That the relative magnitudes differ might be explained by the fact that 
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our data is for 2008 and Gallagher et al. (2013) use data for 2010. Gallagher et al 
(2013) found, using data from 2005 CULS, that having a labour contract was a 
stronger predictor of participating in social insurance for urban workers than migrant 
workers. If, as the findings in Gallagher et al. (2013) suggest, the Labour Contract 
Law magnified the effect of having a labour contract on participating in social 
insurance schemes for migrant workers, but reduced it for urban workers, that our 
data were collected soon after the legislation came into effect, might mean that not 
enough time had elapsed for this trend to come to the fore. The results for the control 
variables (eg. education, gender, work experience, marital status) are consistent with 
previous studies on the determinants of participation in social insurance (see eg. 
Cheng et al., 2014; Freeman & Li, 2013; Gallagher et al., 2013; Gao et al., 2012; 
Nielsen, Nyland, Smyth, Zhang & Zhu, 2005; Song & Appleton, 2008). 
 
[Tables 6 and 7 here] 
 
Tables 8 and 9 present the ATT results for having a labour contract based on three 
different approaches to matching.
10
 For migrant workers with a labour contract, the 
ATT results show that the majority of the difference in outcomes is attributable to 
having a labour contract, relative to the counterfactual of migrant workers not having 
a labour contract. For example, the pre-matching differences of the natural log of the 
hourly wage and the natural log of the monthly wage between contracted and non-
contracted migrant workers are 0.26 and 0.15 points respectively. After propensity 
score matching, having a labour contract increases the natural log of the hourly wage 
by 0.166 to 0.187 points and the natural log of the monthly wage by 0.089 to 0.094 
points for a migrant worker who has a labour contract. The ATTs are smaller than the 
pre-matching differences, but it demonstrates that having a labour contract still has a 
significant effect on these outcomes after taking into account endogeneity. 
 
The vast majority of the differences before matching in the natural log of working 
hours (0.09) or working hours (26.11) for migrant workers can be explained by 
having a labour contract according to the ATT results, suggesting that the Labour 
Contract Law is effective in reducing working hours among migrant workers who 
have a labour contract. The difference before matching in subjective wellbeing 
between migrants with, and without, a labour contract was 0.81 points. The ATT 
results suggest that having a labour contract increases subjective wellbeing of migrant 
workers by 0.45 to 0.52 points. The results also show that having a labour contract 
contributes to most of the difference in participation in all four employee benefits 
between contracted and non-contracted migrant workers. Having a labour contract 
increases the participation rate for migrant workers by 18-19 per cent in 
unemployment insurance, by 25-26 per cent in superannuation, by 24-25 per cent in 
industrial injury insurance and by 11 per cent in the housing provident fund.  
 
                                                        
10 As suggested by Lechner (2002), bootstrapping was used to estimate standard errors in testing the 
statistical significance of treatment effects. Following existing literature (see e.g. Caliendo et al., 2008; 
Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2006; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983), several robustness checks (i.e. standardised 
bias, two-sample t-test and F-test of joint significance) of the covariate imbalance before, and after, 
matching were conducted. Results showed that the matching is reliable with a bias reduction below 5  
per cent. The likelihood-ratio test also rejects the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of all the 
regressors at the 1 per cent significance level. Detailed results are available from the authors. 
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The ATT results for urban workers show that having a labour contract contributes 
between 0.44 and 0.53 points in the natural log of the hourly wage, between 0.45 and 
0.48 points in the natural log of the monthly wage and between 0.03 and 0.05 points 
difference in the natural log of monthly working hours. The ATT of having a labour 
contract on subjective wellbeing of urban workers (1.8-2.0) is higher than the 
difference before matching (1.6). Having a labour contract also contributes to the vast 
majority of difference in the participation of urban workers in unemployment 
insurance, industrial injury insurance and the house provident fund according to the 
results of three matching approaches. In terms of superannuation, the results of 
nearest neighbour matching (0.356) and stratification matching (0.341) show that the 
ATT of having a labour contract is higher than the difference before matching 
(0.3189).
 
This result implies that the Labour Contract Law has helped to protect some 
urban workers who are disadvantaged or have relatively low ability in China’s fast 
evolving labour market. As shown below, the heterogeneous treatment effects of 
having a labour contract among the lower strata of propensity scores are similar to, or 
higher than, those among the higher strata of propensity scores.  
 
[Tables 8 and 9 here] 
 
Tables 10 and 11 present the results of the heterogeneous treatment effects of having 
a labour contract by strata of propensity score (the higher the stratum, the higher the 
propensity to have a labour contract). For migrant workers, the treatment effect of 
having a labour contract on the hourly wage, monthly wage and monthly working 
hours mainly occur at stratum 4 or 5 and above and the effect is larger in the higher 
strata. Meanwhile, the treatment effect is significant for stratum 2 for the hourly wage 
and for strata 1-4 for the monthly working hours. On one hand, having a labour 
contract is more beneficial for those with a higher propensity score. For instance, the 
treatment effects of having a labour contract on the hourly wage and monthly wage 
are as high as 0.45 and 0.29 points for those in stratum 9. On the other hand, having a 
labour contract has some benefits for those with a lower propensity score, although 
the effect is sometimes quite limited. Having a labour contract has the biggest effects 
in improving subjective wellbeing in stratum 1 (only) and in reducing monthly 
working hours in stratum 4. Having a labour contract also helps to distribute the 
benefits more widely between strata in terms of participation in unemployment 
insurance, industrial injury insurance and superannuation, although it remains that the 
higher strata still benefit more than those in the lower strata. In terms of participation 
in the housing dividend fund, the treatment effects are only statistically significant at 
stratum 5 and above. In sum, among migrant workers, having a labour contract has a 
generally positive selection effect in determining wages and access to employee 
benefits, a relatively balanced effect in determining monthly working hours and a 
limited negative selection effect in determining subjective wellbeing. 
 
Among urban workers, the treatment effects on hourly wage and monthly wages are 
more widely distributed than among migrant workers. Most of the strata benefit from 
having a labour contract. In contrast to the results for migrant workers, the largest 
treatment effects do not occur at the highest stratum, but in the lower or upper-middle 
strata, such as stratum 1 (eg. 0.485 in hourly wage and 0.585 in monthly wage) and 
stratum 10 (eg. 0.620 in hourly wage, 0.537 in monthly wage and 4.26 in subjective 
wellbeing). Having a labour contract helps distribute the benefits more widely 
between strata for participation in social insurance and the housing provident fund. In 
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general, among urban workers, having a labour contract has a relatively balanced 
effect in determining wages and access to employee benefits and a (limited) positive 
selection effect in determining monthly working hours and subjective wellbeing.  
 
Overall, the results show that having a labour contract has different patterns of 
heterogeneous treatment effects on the two groups. This demonstrates the existence of 
labour market segregation in urban China. Having a labour contract helps increase 
wages, reduce working hours and improve access to employee benefits for migrant 
workers. In particular, it has a relatively balanced effect across stratum in reducing 
migrant workers’ working hours and improving their access to the three social 
insurance schemes. In the longer term, this is likely to spill over to a broader set of 
outcomes and help break down segregation of the labour market. 
 




In this study we have examined how having a labour contract affects a number of 
employee outcomes for migrant and urban workers. This study improves on other 
recent studies examining the impact of the Labour Contract Law in China in that we 
examine a broader range of outcomes for employees and specifically address the 
causal effect of having a labour contract on a range of employee outcomes using 
propensity score matching. Initial academic comment on the effectiveness of the new 
legislation was sceptical. Zheng (2009) argued that the legislation was likely to be 
ineffective because it would not be adequately enforced. The onset of the Global 
Financial Crisis in 2008 perpetuated concerns that the state would side with the 
interests of capital in terms of taking a lax approach to enforcement (Freeman & Li, 
2013). Early evaluations, based on case studies, were not encouraging. These studies 
generally suggested that the legislation had little, or no, effect on improving employee 
benefits (see eg. Chan, 2009).  More recent studies, using a range of datasets, suggest 
that having a labour contract is positively correlated with various employee outcomes 
(Cheng et al., 2014; Cui et al., 2013; Freeman & Li, 2013; Gallagher et al. 2013; Gao 
et al 2012; Wang et al, 2013). What is striking about our results is that the ATT and 
HTE results suggest that the effect of having a labour contract on myriad employee 
outcomes is generally much larger than previous studies have found.  
 
The effectiveness of the Labour Contract Law is an important public policy issue in 
China. The advocates of the legislation see enhancing job security as a valuable 
public good to be pursued in tandem with business laws strengthening property rights 
(Freeman & Li, 2013). Our results suggest that despite the generally poor 
enforcement of laws in China, the Labour Contract Law is realizing its objectives in 
terms of improving employee outcomes, at least in the major migration destinations 
which are represented in the RUMiC dataset. Previous studies have highlighted the 
distributional consequences of the Labour Contract Law. Tang and Zhao (2009) 
argued that the legislation would benefit skilled workers at the expense of low-skilled 
workers. Cui et al. (2013) found evidence in support of this proposition. While we 
also find that the effect of the law is not homogenous across those with different 
abilities and skills, particularly for migrant workers, the heterogeneous treatment 
effects suggest that the Labour Contract Law has assisted urban workers who are 
disadvantaged in the labour market. This is reflected in the fact that the heterogeneous 
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treatment effects of having a labour contract among the lower strata of propensity 
scores are equivalent or better than those among the higher strata of propensity scores. 
 
One of the limitations of the findings is that they say nothing about what has 
happened since 2008. Gallagher et al. (2013), using 2010 CULS data, also draw rosy 
conclusions about the effect of the Labour Contract Law on employee outcomes. 
However, as Gallagher et al (2013) note, robust labour growth in urban China has 
facilitated implementation of the legislation. Because labour demand has been strong, 
employers have had to offer good conditions, including labour contracts, to attract 
workers. This has allowed the government to adopt a bullish approach to enforcing 
the new law without facing reprisal redundancies from firms. In addition, and also 
noted by Gallagher et al. (2013), in most cases, the requirement to offer open-ended 
contracts has not become binding on employers. One response by employers to the 
legislation was to increase the use of subcontracting. New provisions to the 
legislation, introduced in 2012, have made it more difficult for firms to sidestep the 
legislation using subcontracted labour. It remains to be seen how employers will react 
when the open-ended contract and subcontracting provisions become a binding 
constraint on employers. This suggests the need for further studies examining the 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 Migrant workers Urban workers 
  Labour contract status   Labour contract status  
 Total Yes No Difference Total Yes No Difference 
Hourly wage (RMB) 6.51 7.08 5.42 1.66 14.16 14.77 8.37 6.40 
Ln hourly wage  1.74 1.83 1.57 0.26 2.36 2.42 1.78 0.64 
Monthly wage (RMB) 1414.26 1484.36 1278.98 205.38 2244.48 2347.08 1258.73 1088.35 
Ln monthly wage 7.16 7.21 7.06 0.15 7.48 7.54 6.94 0.60 
Monthly working hours 233.12 224.22 250.33 -26.11 172.25 170.76 186.59 -15.83 
Ln monthly working hours 5.42 5.38 5.49 -0.09 5.11 5.11 5.16 -0.05 
Unemployment insurance (%) 15.36 22.18 2.19 19.99 61.82 66.49 17.16 49.33 
Superannuation (%) 23.60 33.38 4.74 28.64 82.00 85.03 53.14 31.89 
Industrial injury insurance (%) 23.03 32.31 5.16 27.15 53.75 58.21 11.22 46.99 
Housing provident fund (%) 9.20 13.29 1.30 11.99 54.27 59.16 7.59   51.57 
General Health Questionnaire 12 (GHQ-12) index (0-36) 28.37 28.64 27.83 0.81 28.57 28.72 27.12 1.60 
Male (%) 60.56    56.28    
Age (years) 29.88    40.15    
Married (no=1, yes=1) (%) 53.80    84.03    
Poor health (no=1, yes=1) (%) 1.21    1.89    
Schooling (years) 9.39    12.32    
Work experience (years) 3.96    13.08    
Has labour contract (no=1, yes=1) (%) 65.84    90.52    
Received occupational training (no=1, yes=1) (%) 25.87    36.86    
Employer size (%)         
  More than 50 employees (no=1, yes=1)  49.94    64.97    
Employer ownership (%)         
  SOE/COE/government agency and affiliate 15.77    65.46    
  Private-owned, foreign-owned and joint-venture 61.84    25.38    
  Micro-entrepreneur (getihu) and others 22.39    9.16    
Employer sector (%)         
  Manufacturing   25.12    19.29    
  Construction 12.60    3.43    
  Wholesale and retail services 15.58    9.84    
  Hotel and catering services 18.82    2.92    
  Others
 
27.88    64.51    
Employer subsidy (%)         
  Meals (no=1, yes=1) 70.20    34.21    
  Housing (no=1, yes=1) 64.41    3.11    
Region (%)         
  South (Guangdong) 23.50    15.62    
  East (Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang) 35.70    34.27    
  Central and west (Hubei, Henan, Anhui, Chongqing, Sichuan) 40.80    50.12    
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Table 2 Access to labour contract (logit regression) 
 Migrant workers Urban workers 
 Coefficient  Marginal effect Coefficient  Marginal effect 
Male 0.159** (2.23) 0.0346 0.0659 (0.66) 0.0028 
Married 0.240*** (3.19) 0.0520 -0.142 (-1.05) -0.0058 
Poor health -0.930*** (-3.13) -0.2233 -0.644** (-2.17) -0.0367 
Schooling 0.0914*** (6.14) 0.0198 0.157*** (9.20) 0.0067 
Work experience 0.0405** (2.16) 0.0088 0.134*** (10.22) 0.0057 
Work experience
2 
-0.00225** (-2.37) -0.0005 -0.00209*** (-6.22) -0.0001 
Received occupational training 0.323*** (4.05) 0.0678 0.465*** (3.99) 0.0189 
Employer has more than 50 employees 0.576*** (7.50) 0.1241 0.986*** (9.09) 0.0494 
Employer ownership (ref: micro-entrepreneur and others)       
  SOE/COE/government agency and affiliate 0.993*** (8.46) 0.1846 1.370*** (10.37) 0.0747 
  Private-owned, foreign-owned and joint-venture 0.675*** (8.30) 0.1493 0.758*** (5.76) 0.0277 
Employment sector (ref: others)       
  Manufacturing 0.231** (2.14) 0.0489 -0.00887 (-0.06) 0.0004 
  Construction -0.826*** (-6.93) -0.1936 -0.699*** (-3.00) -0.0405 
  Wholesale and retail services -0.0490 (-0.47) -0.0107 -0.278** (-2.00) -0.0131 
  Hotel and catering services -0.294*** (-2.96) -0.0656 -0.168 (-0.72) -0.0077 
Meals 0.350*** (4.36) 0.0776 0.508*** (3.89) 0.0203 
Housing 0.0537 (0.70) 0.0117 0.206 (0.57) 0.0069 
Region (ref: south)       
  East 0.391*** (4.11) 0.0828 0.348** (2.37) 0.0142 
  Central and west -0.351*** (-3.95) -0.0767 -0.00277 (-0.02) -0.0001 
Constant -1.500*** (-7.39)  -2.070*** (-7.43)  
N 4756   6241   
Pseudo R
2
 0.1109   0.2452   
z statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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Table 3 Wage of migrant and urban workers (OLS regression) 
 Migrant workers Urban workers 
 Ln hourly wage Ln monthly wage Ln hourly wage Ln monthly wage 
Male 0.0814*** (6.07) 0.124*** (11.09) 0.181*** (11.35) 0.218*** (15.22) 
Married -0.0151 (-1.07) 0.00763 (0.65) 0.0797*** (3.45) 0.0863*** (4.14) 
Poor health -0.133** (-2.28) -0.125*** (-2.58) -0.246*** (-4.21) -0.226*** (-4.33) 
Schooling 0.0496*** (17.75) 0.0355*** (15.25) 0.0564*** (22.55) 0.0522*** (23.15) 
Work experience 0.0495*** (13.90) 0.0412*** (13.88) 0.0237*** (9.75) 0.0250*** (11.42) 
Work experience
2 
-0.00162*** (-8.90) -0.00131*** (-8.58) -0.000375*** (-5.85) -0.000475*** (-8.24) 
Has labour contract 0.121*** (8.55) 0.0590*** (5.03) 0.253*** (8.72) 0.236*** (8.99) 
Received occupational training 0.0601*** (4.11) 0.0703*** (5.78) 0.0898*** (5.48) 0.0872*** (5.89) 
Employer has more than 50 employees 0.0645*** (4.37) 0.00854 (0.70) 0.165*** (9.27) 0.180*** (11.22) 
Employer ownership (ref: micro-entrepreneur and others)        
  SOE/COE/government agency and affiliate 0.0852*** (3.84) 0.0135 (0.73) 0.133*** (4.41) 0.0552** (2.03) 
  Private-owned, foreign-owned and joint-venture 0.0539*** (3.24) 0.0116 (0.84) 0.165*** (5.28) 0.126*** (4.46) 
Employment sector (ref: others)         
  Manufacturing 0.0441** (2.31) 0.0308* (1.94) -0.180*** (-8.62) -0.161*** (-8.55) 
  Construction 0.145*** (6.18) 0.187*** (9.61) -0.0675 (-1.57) -0.0196 (-0.50) 
  Wholesale and retail services 0.00614 (0.30) 0.0160 (0.95) -0.109*** (-3.96) -0.0944*** (-3.81) 
  Hotel and catering services -0.0767*** (-3.95) -0.0542*** (-3.35) -0.183*** (-3.85) -0.152*** (-3.53) 
Meals -0.0159 (-1.03) -0.00957 (-0.74) 0.175*** (9.94) 0.193*** (12.12) 
Housing -0.0759*** (-5.19) -0.0344*** (-2.83) 0.0399 (0.88) 0.0339 (0.83) 
Region (ref: south)         
  East 0.0225 (1.31) 0.0276* (1.93) -0.312*** (-12.86) -0.312*** (-14.25) 
  Central and west -0.330*** (-19.54) -0.269*** (-19.10) -0.648*** (-28.68) -0.612*** (-29.98) 
Constant 1.094*** (28.48) 6.671*** (208.69) 1.228*** (24.69) 6.417*** (142.84) 
N 4733  4754  6201  6230  
Adjusted R
2
 0.318  0.298  0.334  0.359  
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***






Table 4 Monthly working hours of migrant and urban workers (OLS regression) 
 Ln monthly working hours 
 Migrant workers Urban workers 
Ln monthly wage -0.0225** (-2.48) 0.00577 (0.92) 
Schooling -0.0133*** (-8.93) -0.00450*** (-3.90) 
Work experience -0.00739*** (-3.91) 0.00131 (1.20) 
Work experience
2 
0.000291*** (3.04) -0.0000951*** (-3.34) 
Male 0.0459*** (6.49) 0.0356*** (4.96) 
Married 0.0223*** (3.04) 0.00678 (0.66) 
Poor health 0.00433 (0.14) 0.0303 (1.17) 
Has labour contract -0.0597*** (-8.12) -0.0199 (-1.54) 
Received occupational training 0.0111 (1.45) -0.00679 (-0.93) 
Employer has more than 50 employees -0.0557*** (-7.26) 0.0118 (1.48) 
Employer ownership (ref: micro-entrepreneur and others)     
  SOE/COE/government agency and affiliate -0.0715*** (-6.19) -0.0758*** (-5.68) 
  Private-owned, foreign-owned and joint-venture -0.0415*** (-4.81) -0.0374*** (-2.69) 
Employment sector (ref: others)     
  Manufacturing -0.0125 (-1.26) 0.0221** (2.37) 
  Construction 0.0480*** (3.90) 0.0470** (2.46) 
  Wholesale and retail services 0.0104 (0.99) 0.0179 (1.47) 
  Hotel and catering services 0.0216** (2.14) 0.0312 (1.47) 
Meals 0.00562 (0.70) 0.0172** (2.18) 
Housing 0.0396*** (5.19) -0.00713 (-0.36) 
Region (ref: south)     
  East 0.00603 (0.67) 0.00344 (0.31) 
  Central and west 0.0553*** (6.06) 0.0403*** (3.77) 
Constant 5.728*** (89.88) 5.150*** (112.66) 
N 4734  6201  
Adjusted R
2
 0.143  0.028  
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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Table 5 Subjective wellbeing among migrant and urban workers (OLS regression) 
 Migrant workers Urban workers 
Ln hourly wage 0.544*** (3.30) 0.717*** (5.69) 
Schooling 0.203*** (6.39) 0.0553** (2.11) 
Age -0.0651 (-1.33) -0.215*** (-3.10) 
Age
2 
0.000929 (1.43) 0.00214*** (2.62) 
Work experience -0.0924** (-2.35) 0.00263 (0.11) 
Work experience
2 
0.00327* (1.68) 0.0000106 (0.02) 
Male 0.749*** (5.10) 0.652*** (4.22) 
Married 0.860*** (4.18) 0.496* (1.87) 
Poor health -3.027*** (-4.64) -4.892*** (-9.33) 
Has labour contract 0.384** (2.47) 0.728** (2.57) 
Has unemployment insurance  0.935*** (3.14) 0.103 (0.48) 
Has superannuation -0.860*** (-3.31) -0.286 (-1.24) 
Has industrial injury insurance 1.054*** (4.24) 0.235 (1.17) 
Has house provident fund -1.232*** (-4.05) 0.0879 (0.45) 
Received occupational training 0.217 (1.39) -0.399** (-2.57) 
Employer has more than 50 employees 0.0224 (0.14) -0.00925 (-0.05) 
Employer ownership (ref: micro-entrepreneur and others)     
  SOE/COE/government agency and affiliate -0.152 (-0.73) 0.334 (1.17) 
  Private-owned, foreign-owned and joint-venture 0.228 (0.90) 0.501* (1.66) 
Employment sector (ref: others)     
  Manufacturing -0.152 (-0.73) -0.238 (-1.17) 
  Construction 0.228 (0.90) -0.0609 (-0.14) 
  Wholesale and retail services 0.325 (1.48) -0.321 (-1.18) 
  Hotel and catering services 0.242 (1.16) -0.650 (-1.39) 
Meals 0.0417 (0.25) -0.296* (-1.72) 
Housing 0.134 (0.83) -0.793* (-1.83) 
Region (ref: south)     
  East -0.460** (-2.43) 1.492*** (6.41) 
  Central and west -0.146 (-0.77) 1.624*** (7.08) 
Constant 25.51*** (28.89) 28.64*** (19.75) 
N 4210  3693  
Adjusted R
2
 0.049  0.075  
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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Table 6 Access to social insurance among migrant workers (logit regression) 
 Unemployment insurance Superannuation Industrial injury insurance House provident fund 
 Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect 
Schooling 0.0934*** (7.76) 0.0139 0.109*** (10.03) 0.0260 0.0770*** (7.20) 0.0186 0.0639*** (4.64) 0.0056 
Work experience 0.115*** (7.04) 0.0171 0.0978*** (6.79) 0.0232 0.0885*** (6.31) 0.0214 0.0852*** (4.57) 0.0075 
Work experience2 -0.00432*** (-4.77) -0.0006 -0.00339*** (-4.30) -0.0008 -0.00331*** (-4.39) -0.0008 -0.00311*** (-3.01) -0.0003 
Male -0.0929* (-1.69) -0.0140 -0.00537 (-0.11) -0.0013 0.0685 (1.37) 0.0164 0.0207 (0.32) 0.0018 
Married 0.110* (1.87) 0.0163 0.179*** (3.37) 0.0424 0.110** (2.08) 0.0264 -0.0196 (-0.29) -0.0017 
Poor health -0.643 (-1.40) -0.0605 -0.167 (-0.60) -0.0364 -0.444 (-1.45) -0.0846 -- -- -- 
Has labour contract 0.916*** (11.10) 0.1149 0.892*** (13.71) 0.1834 0.854*** (13.45) 0.1798 0.726*** (7.31) 0.0541 
Received occupational training -0.0841 (-1.43) -0.0122 0.114** (2.18) 0.0278 0.137*** (2.65) 0.0341 -0.0666 (-0.98) -0.0057 
Employer has more than 50 employees 0.452*** (7.08) 0.0677 0.537*** (9.62) 0.1275 0.512*** (9.35) 0.1237 0.458*** (6.03) 0.0408 
Employer ownership (ref: micro-entrepreneur and others)            
  SOE/COE/government agency and affiliate 0.240** (2.40) 0.0399 0.450*** (5.18) 0.1234 0.395*** (4.51) 0.1082 0.588*** (4.89) 0.0729 
  Private-owned, foreign-owned and joint-venture 0.184** (2.17) 0.0266 0.194*** (2.65) 0.0451 0.309*** (4.19) 0.0720 0.249** (2.29) 0.0208 
Employment sector (ref: others)             
  Manufacturing 0.407*** (5.67) 0.0696 0.372*** (5.67) 0.0965 0.327*** (4.99) 0.0854 0.472*** (5.76) 0.0510 
  Construction -0.535*** (-4.48) -0.0599 -0.561*** (-5.68) -0.1059 -0.0834 (-0.94) -0.0195 -0.620*** (-4.22) -0.0369 
  Wholesale and retail services -0.157 (-1.64) -0.0217 -0.0457 (-0.57) -0.0107 -0.114 (-1.37) -0.0266 -0.0190 (-0.16) -0.0016 
  Hotel and catering services -0.142 (-1.63) -0.0199 -0.180** (-2.33) -0.0404 -0.118 (-1.54) -0.0275 -0.0656 (-0.63) -0.0055 
Meals 0.335*** (4.92) 0.0453 0.216*** (3.68) 0.0489 0.256*** (4.41) 0.0587 0.363*** (4.44) 0.0281 
Housing -0.0716 (-1.18) -0.0108 -0.0137 (-0.25) -0.0033 0.0895 (1.64) 0.0214 -0.0654 (-0.93) -0.0058 
Region (ref: south)             
  East -0.0494 (-0.77) -0.0073 -0.196*** (-3.31) -0.0453 -0.295*** (-5.01) -0.0683 0.599*** (7.83) 0.0621 
  Central and west -0.511*** (-7.17) -0.0721 -0.633*** (-10.04) -0.1419 -0.707*** (-11.34) -0.1603 0.0137 (0.16) 0.0012 
Constant -3.482*** (-18.81)  -0.254*** (-7.77)  -3.033*** (-19.03)  -3.972*** (-17.75)  
N 4753   4753   4753   4698   
Pseudo R2 0.2612   0.2792   0.2390   0.2457   
Fifty five cases with poor health status were dropped in the house provident fund model because they predicted no access perfectly in the nonlinear logistic model. Dropping this should exert little 
impact on the model since poor health status is statistically insignificant in the other three models. 
z statistics in parentheses 











Table 7 Access to social insurance among urban workers (logit regression) 
 Unemployment insurance Superannuation Industrial injury insurance House provident fund 
 Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect 
Schooling 0.0336*** (6.00) 0.0127 0.0119* (1.87) 0.0028 0.0272*** (4.98) 0.0108 0.0947*** (15.19) 0.0376 
Work experience 0.0328*** (6.23) 0.0124 0.0235*** (4.19) 0.0056 0.0211*** (4.03) 0.0084 0.0701*** (12.62) 0.0278 
Work experience2 -0.000604*** (-4.38) -0.0002 -0.000604*** (-4.20) -0.0001 -0.000439*** (-3.22) -0.0002 -0.00109*** (-7.54) -0.0004 
Male -0.00803 (-0.23) -0.0030 -0.0546 (-1.36) -0.0130 0.0896*** (2.58) 0.0356 0.108*** (2.90) 0.0428 
Married -0.0970* (-1.88) -0.0362 0.114** (2.01) 0.0282 -0.105** (-2.06) -0.0417 -0.141*** (-2.63) -0.0556 
Poor health -0.206 (-1.56) -0.0798 0.0612 (0.41) 0.0142 -0.456*** (-3.41) -0.1787 -0.136 (-0.97) -0.0543 
Has labour contract 0.978*** (14.07) 0.3743 0.660*** (10.58) 0.1979 1.076*** (13.98) 0.3867 0.915*** (10.38) 0.3402 
Received occupational training 0.148*** (4.03) 0.0554 0.175*** (4.07) 0.0408 0.217*** (6.07) 0.0861 0.215*** (5.62) 0.0849 
Employer has more than 50 employees 0.299*** (7.75) 0.1141 0.163*** (3.75) 0.0398 0.300*** (7.81) 0.1190 0.409*** (10.08) 0.1619 
Employer ownership (ref: micro-entrepreneur and others)            
  SOE/COE/government agency and affiliate 0.277*** (4.15) 0.1055 0.243*** (3.54) 0.0601 0.351*** (5.10) 0.1393 0.713*** (9.21) 0.2786 
  Private-owned, foreign-owned and joint-venture 0.0456 (0.65) 0.0172 0.0801 (1.13) 0.0187 0.205*** (2.84) 0.0809 0.137* (1.68) 0.0543 
Employment sector (ref: others)             
  Manufacturing 0.132*** (2.78) 0.0492 0.271*** (4.70) 0.0593 0.169*** (3.68) 0.0666 -0.115** (-2.39) -0.0459 
  Construction -0.0761 (-0.80) -0.0290 -0.00723 (-0.07) -0.0017 -0.0520 (-0.55) -0.0207 -0.366*** (-3.59) -0.1447 
  Wholesale and retail services 0.0489 (0.80) 0.0184 -0.0381 (-0.57) -0.0092 -0.0693 (-1.14) -0.0276 -0.221*** (-3.39) -0.0879 
  Hotel and catering services -0.122 (-1.12) -0.0469 -0.301*** (-2.72) -0.0819 -0.0117 (-0.11) -0.0047 -0.256** (-2.15) -0.1017 
Meals 0.179*** (4.50) 0.0668 0.180*** (3.84) 0.0417 0.166*** (4.32) 0.0656 0.342*** (8.26) 0.1343 
Housing -0.0352 (-0.35) -0.0134 -0.0173 (-0.15) -0.0041 0.131 (1.31) 0.0517 -0.171 (-1.63) -0.0681 
Region (ref: south)             
  East 0.394*** (7.26) 0.1446 0.341*** (5.45) 0.0771 -0.0149 (-0.28) -0.0059 0.416*** (7.30) 0.1626 
  Central and west -0.239*** (-4.82) -0.0899 -0.132** (-2.41) -0.0315 -0.569*** (-11.34) -0.2233 0.0724 (1.36) 0.0288 
Constant -1.680*** (-14.49)  -0.437*** (-3.70)  -1.687*** (-14.06)  -3.524*** (-24.75)  
N 6240   6239   6237   6239   
Pseudo R2 0.1444   0.1025   0.1341   0.2642   
z statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 




Table 8 Average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of labour contract among migrant workers 
 Hourly wage Ln hourly wage Monthly wage Ln monthly 
wage 
Working hours Ln monthly 
working hours 
Nearest neighbour matching 1.218*** 0.187*** 139.281*** 0.089*** -20.648*** -0.075*** 
 (7.620) (9.075) (4.836) (5.820) (-7.445) (-3.970) 
Kernel matching 1.168*** 0.174*** 140.637*** 0.094*** -18.953*** -0.078*** 
 (11.142) (9.584) (11.762) (11.034) (-10.816) (-7.526) 
Stratification matching 1.100*** 0.166*** 127.831*** 0.084*** -19.119 *** -0.069*** 









Nearest neighbour matching 0.424 0.180*** 0.252*** 0.238*** 0.114*** 
 (1.617) (17.742) (12.339) (17.949) (11.900) 
Kernel matching 0.520*** 0.189*** 0.259*** 0.251*** 0.111*** 
 (3.056) (29.475) (21.225) (17.958) (12.936) 
Stratification matching 0.450** 0.185*** 0.255*** 0.249*** 0.109*** 
 (2.326) (14.498) (21.439) (23.583) (13.424) 
t statistics in parentheses are calculated by bootstrapping method 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***



















Table 9 Average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of labour contract among urban workers 
 Hourly wage Ln hourly wage Monthly wage Ln monthly 
wage 
Working hours Ln monthly 
working hours 
Nearest neighbour matching 6.514*** 0.501*** 954.815*** 0.454*** -8.401 -0.056 
 (9.335) (8.036) (13.207) (5.500) (-0.772) (-1.899) 
Kernel matching 6.047*** 0.525*** 934.062*** 0.477***  -9.895 -0.046 
 (11.431) (14.730) (11.472) (12.188) (-1.751) (-1.626) 
Stratification matching 5.530*** 0.442*** 821.602*** 0.410*** -8.290 -0.038 









Nearest neighbour matching 2.006*** 0.419*** 0.356*** 0.389*** 0.461*** 
 (4.327) (5.472) (5.104) (18.102) (17.869) 
Kernel matching 1.820*** 0.458*** 0.272*** 0.414*** 0.462*** 
 (4.608) (15.947) (9.498) (12.614) (20.601) 
Stratification matching 1.886*** 0.447*** 0.341*** 0.393*** 0.439*** 
 (3.505) (10.029) (6.162) (10.496) (18.650) 
t statistics in parentheses are calculated by bootstrapping method 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***





Table 10 Heterogeneous treatment effect (HTE) of labour contract among migrant workers 
Treatment effect by strata Ln hourly wage Ln monthly wage Ln monthly working hours Subjective wellbeing 
1 0.0696 (1.42) 0.0363 (0.83) -0.0388* (-1.76) 1.291*** (2.83) 
2 0.136*** (3.16) 0.0592 (1.57) -0.0778*** (-4.39) 0.456 (1.12) 
3 0.0456 (0.86) 0.0352 (0.73) -0.0583** (-3.22) 0.572 (1.53) 
4 0.0422 (0.82) -0.0635 (-1.38) -0.586*** (-3.61) 0.342 (1.04) 
5 0.129*** (3.80) 0.0748*** (2.58) -0.0156 (-0.67) -0.0739 (-0.15) 
6 0.144*** (4.22) 0.0993*** (3.37) -0.0546** (-2.31) 0.170 (0.34) 
7 0.128** (2.41) 0.0593 (1.48) -0.0848** (-3.24) 0.643 (1.27) 
8 0.291*** (4.25) 0.110** (2.05) -0.145*** (-3.63) 1.159 (1.43) 
9 0.450*** (3.26) 0.292*** (2.78) -0.0414 (-0.60) 1.180 (1.01) 
Linear trend         
  Slope 0.0202*** (2.67) 0.0130** (2.03) -0.00311 (-0.83) -0.0479 (-0.63) 
  Constant 0.0328 (0.87) 0.00277 (0.08) -0.0477** (-2.93) 0.714** (2.09) 
         
Treatment effect by strata Unemployment insurance Superannuation Industrial injury insurance House provident fund 
1 0.0323*** (2.65) 0.0632*** (3.38) 0.0609*** (3.46) 0.00599 (1.28) 
2 0.0186 (1.46) 0.0551*** (3.31) 0.0622*** (3.06) -0.00221 (-0.27) 
3 0.00791 (0.41) 0.0274 (1.06) 0.0100 (0.36) 0.00684 (0.52) 
4 0.0672*** (2.69) 0.116*** (3.77) 0.107*** (3.35) 0.0188 (1.14) 
5 0.106*** (5.72) 0.140*** (5.95) 0.139*** (5.83) 0.0430*** (3.17) 
6 0.138*** (5.56) 0.224*** (7.25) 0.217*** (7.15) 0.0919*** (4.65) 
7 0.294*** (5.58) 0.387*** (6.88) 0.338*** (5.98) 0.162*** (3.76) 
8 0.398*** (5.39) 0.431*** (5.84) 0.493*** (6.74) 0.172*** (2.63) 
9 0.404*** (2.76) 0.654*** (5.07) 0.588*** (4.28) 0.439*** (3.05) 
Linear trend         
  Slope 0.0278*** (7.45) 0.0401*** (8.47) 0.0379*** (7.98) 0.0133*** (5.64) 
  Constant -0.0239* (-1.93) -0.0216 (-1.26) -0.0145 (-0.83) -0.0139** (-2.37) 
N=4756 
z statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***







Table 11 Heterogeneous treatment effect (HTE) of labour contract among urban workers 
Treatment effect by strata Ln hourly wage Ln monthly wage Ln monthly working hours Subjective wellbeing 
1 0.485** (2.55) 0.585*** (4.12) 0.0999 (0.71) 0.210 (0.14) 
2 0.140* (1.70) 0.166** (2.30) 0.0252 (0.46) 0.940 (0.72) 
3 0.130 (1.55) 0.173** (2.39) 0.0393 (0.82) 0.804 (0.78) 
4 0.204* (1.73) 0.212** (2.00) 0.0125 (0.19) 0.869 (0.88) 
5 0.0641 (0.55) 0.0528 (0.47) 0.00875 (0.15) -0.104 (-0.15) 
6 -0.0863 (-0.51) -0.0600 (-0.40) 0.0263 (0.32) 0.988 (1.37) 
7 0.263*** (2.83) 0.225*** (2.74) -0.0432 (-0.95) 0.489 (0.66) 
8 0.236*** (2.87) 0.208*** (2.90) -0.0271 (-0.88) 1.140 (1.50) 
9 0.475*** (5.28) 0.395*** (4.93) -0.0917** (-2.25) 2.537** (1.96) 
10 0.620*** (4.39) 0.537*** (3.98) -0.0747 (-1.51) 4.262** (2.40) 
11 0.533*** (3.32) 0.537*** (3.58) 0.00711 (0.15) 3.447** (2.17) 
12 0.404** (2.01) 0.377** (1.98) -0.0266 (-0.41) -- -- 
Linear trend         
  Slope 0.0367*** (3.51) 0.0207** (2.24) -0.00955* (-1.91) 0.255** (2.03) 
  Constant 0.0368 (0.53) 0.126** (2.08) 0.0484 (1.24) -0.570 (-0.72) 
         
Treatment effect by strata Unemployment insurance Superannuation Industrial injury insurance  House provident fund 
1 0.0974 (1.03) 0.242* (1.83) 0.149* (1.81) 0.0744 (1.23) 
2 0.186*** (3.22) 0.120* (1.88) 0.179*** (3.43) -0.0153 (-0.49) 
3 0.280*** (4.47) 0.241*** (3.67) 0.295*** (5.32) 0.0926** (2.33) 
4 0.206*** (2.58) 0.223*** (2.83) 0.191*** (2.58) 0.138** (2.35) 
5 0.156 (1.61) 0.203** (2.25) 0.219** (2.39) 0.0974 (1.36) 
6 0.235* (1.93) 0.146 (1.23) 0.275** (2.48) 0.200** (2.16) 
7 0.375*** (5.83) 0.188*** (3.12) 0.321*** (5.04) 0.195*** (3.55) 
8 0.390*** (6.55) 0.201*** (3.83) 0.380*** (6.47) 0.245*** (4.40) 
9 0.477*** (7.49) 0.278*** (5.50) 0.429*** (6.63) 0.372*** (5.77) 
10 0.395*** (4.53) 0.264*** (4.30) 0.370*** (3.93) 0.524*** (5.62) 
11 0.380*** (3.77) 0.288*** (3.95) 0.395*** (3.54) 0.356*** (3.42) 
12 0.505*** (4.01) 0.350*** (3.77) 0.315** (2.23) 0.583*** (5.48) 
Linear trend         
  Slope 0.0321*** (4.66) 0.0126* (1.95) 0.0249*** (3.71) 0.0460*** (8.57) 
  Constant 0.119** (2.53) 0.141*** (2.86) 0.150*** (3.49) -0.0737** (-2.47) 
N=6241 
z statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01
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Appendix 1: Wage of migrant and urban workers (OLS regression with propensity score as a proxy of ability) 
 Migrant workers Urban workers 
 Ln hourly wage Ln monthly wage Ln hourly wage Ln monthly wage 
Male 0.104*** (6.37) 0.127*** (9.28) 0.181*** (11.38) 0.219*** (15.30) 
Married 0.0196 (0.98) 0.0119 (0.71) 0.0740*** (3.14) 0.0741*** (3.48) 
Poor health -0.292*** (-3.33) -0.145** (-1.98) -0.257*** (-4.34) -0.249*** (-4.72) 
Schooling 0.0634*** (10.05) 0.0372*** (7.08) 0.0583*** (19.76) 0.0563*** (21.15) 
Work experience 0.0564*** (12.38) 0.0420*** (11.06) 0.0257*** (8.70) 0.0294*** (11.02) 
Work experience
2 
-0.00201*** (-8.31) -0.00135*** (-6.71) -0.000413*** (-5.78) -0.000557*** (-8.67) 
Has labour contract 0.120*** (8.52) 0.0590*** (5.03) 0.259*** (8.80) 0.248*** (9.34) 
Received occupational training 0.107*** (4.42) 0.0760*** (3.78) 0.0953*** (5.60) 0.0989*** (6.45) 
Employer has more than 50 employees 0.154*** (3.88) 0.0195 (0.59) 0.178*** (8.44) 0.209*** (10.99) 
Employer ownership (ref: micro-entrepreneur and others)        
  SOE/COE/government agency and affiliate 0.245*** (3.53) 0.0330 (0.57) 0.168*** (3.98) 0.132*** (3.46) 
  Private-owned, foreign-owned and joint-venture 0.172*** (3.35) 0.0260 (0.61) 0.195*** (4.90) 0.190*** (5.29) 
Employment sector (ref: others)         
  Manufacturing 0.0670*** (3.15) 0.0336* (1.90) -0.180*** (-8.61) -0.161*** (-8.55) 
  Construction 0.0107 (0.18) 0.171*** (3.42) -0.0761* (-1.74) -0.0382 (-0.97) 
  Wholesale and retail services -0.00463 (-0.22) 0.0147 (0.85) -0.114*** (-4.10) -0.105*** (-4.19) 
  Hotel and catering services -0.125*** (-4.50) -0.0602*** (-2.59) -0.190*** (-3.96) -0.166*** (-3.83) 
Meals 0.0388 (1.42) -0.00290 (-0.13) 0.179*** (9.98) 0.202*** (12.45) 
Housing -0.0687*** (-4.60) -0.0336*** (-2.70) 0.0420 (0.93) 0.0385 (0.94) 
Region (ref: south)         
  East 0.0758*** (2.72) 0.0341 (1.47) -0.307*** (-12.53) -0.303*** (-13.67) 
  Central and west -0.390*** (-13.03) -0.276*** (-11.07) -0.648*** (-28.70) -0.613*** (-30.04) 
Propensity score 0.768** (2.43) 0.0936 (0.36) 0.185 (1.20) 0.399*** (2.87) 
Constant 0.489* (1.95) 6.597*** (31.46) 1.128*** (11.61) 6.200*** (70.68) 
N 4733  4754  6201  6230  
Adjusted R
2
 0.318  0.298  0.334  0.360  
t statistics in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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Appendix 2: Monthly working hours of migrant and urban workers (IV regression) 
 Migrant workers Urban workers 
Ln monthly wage 0.0328** (2.36) -0.0503 (-0.67) 
Schooling -0.0153*** (-4.31) -0.00157 (-0.39) 
Work experience -0.00967** (-2.31) 0.00271 (1.25) 
Work experience
2 
0.000363** (2.39) -0.000122*** (-2.67) 
Male 0.0390*** (2.93) 0.0478*** (2.69) 
Married 0.0219*** (2.97) 0.0117 (0.96) 
Poor health 0.0113 (0.35) 0.0182 (0.59) 
Has labour contract -0.0630*** (-6.91) -0.00676 (-0.31) 
Received occupational training 0.00721 (0.73) -0.00211 (-0.22) 
Employer has more than 50 employees -0.0562*** (-7.28) 0.0217 (1.40) 
Employer ownership (ref: micro-entrepreneur and others)     
  SOE/COE/government agency and affiliate -0.0723*** (-6.21) -0.0726*** (-5.16) 
  Private-owned, foreign-owned and joint-venture -0.0422*** (-4.84) -0.0302* (-1.78) 
Employment sector (ref: others)     
  Manufacturing -0.0142 (-1.37) 0.0132 (0.87) 
  Construction 0.0375* (1.78) 0.0458** (2.38) 
  Wholesale and retail services 0.00954 (0.89) 0.0128 (0.91) 
  Hotel and catering services 0.0246** (2.19) 0.0226 (0.94) 
Meals 0.00618 (0.76) 0.0281* (1.70) 
Housing 0.0415*** (5.01) -0.00528 (-0.26) 
Region (ref: south)     
  East 0.00449 (0.48) -0.0139 (-0.54) 
  Central and west 0.0701*** (2.70) 0.00606 (0.13) 
Constant 5.358*** (8.82) 5.510*** (11.43) 
N 4733  6201  
Adjusted R
2
 0.140  0.018  
Regression diagnostics     
First-stage regression summary statistics      
  F test 13.29***  21.72***  
R
2
 0.3077  0.3633  
  Adjusted R
2
 0.3046  0.3641  
  Minimum eigenvalue statistic (5 % critical value) 23.7391 (19.93)  21.7205 (19.93) ` 
Test of overidentifying restrictions: p value 0.8946  0.4113  
t statistics in parentheses unless specified 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
